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IN RE R.M.J.: REASSESSING THE EXTENSION
OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
TO ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
The extension of first amendment protection to attorney advertising is of
recent origin.' Prior to 1977, bar association rules in every state prohibited
an individual attorney from utilizing any form of media advertisement.2
These rules made it difficult for many consumers to gain access to informa-
tion about their legal rights and the availability of legal services.3 The
American Bar Association, however, asserted that total proscription was
justified to protect consumers from potentially deceptive legal advertise-
ments.4 In addition, it was argued that competitive advertising by attor-
neys would bring about commercialization of the legal profession and
thereby undermine public confidence in attorneys and the law.5 Despite
widespread acceptance by the American Bar, these asserted justifications
proved inadequate to support state prohibition of attorney advertising
1. The first amendment guarantees of freedom of expression and association were first
extended to legal solicitation by legal rights organizations in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963) (upholding the right of the NAACP to solicit clients to challenge school segrega-
tion laws in Virginia). See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. However, first amend-
ment protection of individual attorney advertising was not granted until Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). See infra notes 82-107 and accompanying text.
2. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, formulated by the American Bar
Association in 1969 and later adopted into law by every state, placed a general prohibition
on all forms of media advertisement. Disciplinary Rule 2-101(A) stated "a lawyer shall not
prepare, cause to be prepared, use, or participate in the use of, any form of public communi-
cation. . . calculated to attract lay clients.... See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILiTY DR 2-101 (1976).
3. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. See generaly Francis & Johnson, The
Emperor's Old Clothes: Piercing the Bar's Ethical Veil, 13 WILLAMETrE L.J. 221 (1977);
Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Professional's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Avail-
able, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972) (advocating reform of the attorney advertising ban before the
Bates decision).
4. Prior to 1977, Ethical Consideration 2-9 of the Model Code read in pertinent part:
"The traditional ban against advertising by lawyers, which is subject to certain limited ex-
ceptions, is rooted in the public interest. Competitive advertising would encourage extrava-
gant, artful self-laudatory brashness in seeking business and thus, could mislead the
layman." See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 2-9 (1976).
5. Prior to 1977, Ethical Consideration 2-9 of the Model Code contained the following
assertion: "[competitive advertising] would inevitably produce unrealistic expectations in
particular cases and bring about distrust of the law and lawyers. Thus, public confidence in
our legal system would be impaired by such advertisements of professional services." See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILrrY EC 2-9 (1976).
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against a challenge based on the free speech clause of the first
amendment.
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,7 the United States Supreme Court bal-
anced the interests of the states in regulating the legal profession against
the first amendment rights of both attorneys and consumers.8 Having re-
cently extended first amendment protection to commercial speech,9 the
Court in Bates held that attorney advertising is entitled to limited first
amendment protection and, therefore cannot be subjected to blanket sup-
pression.'" Although the Bates decision clearly curtailed state power in
this area, the degree to which states could continue to regulate attorney
advertising remained unclear.
In response to the Bates decision, all states and the District of Columbia
revised their rules on attorney advertising to allow some media access."
Nevertheless, most jurisdictions were unwilling to abandon the firmly en-
trenched restrictive approach to attorney advertising.' 2 Though some
adopted rules that significantly facilitated attorney use of effective adver-
tising means, 3 the majority of jurisdictions adopted rules that narrowly
limited attorney advertising in terms of content, format, and media. 4
Typifying the more restrictive approach were the rules adopted by the
State Supreme Court of Missouri. 5
6. In Bates, the Court said, "We suspect that, with advertising, most lawyers will be-
have as they always have: They will abide by their solemn oaths to uphold the integrity and
honor of their profession and of the legal system." Bates, 433 U.S. at 379. Therefore, the
Court was not persuaded that the traditional justifications for advertising prohibitions ade-
quately supported the resulting infringement on free speech rights. Id
7. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
8. See infra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
9. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976). Prior to this decision, commercial speech was not considered subject to first
amendment protection. For a general discussion of this decision, see infra notes 72-81 and
accompanying text.
10. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
11. See Andrews, The ModelRules and Advertising, 68 A.B.A. J. 808 (1982).
12. See infra notes 27-67 and accompanying text.
13. Eighteen states and the District of Columbia generally allow "dignified" forms of
truthful attorney advertising. See Andrews, supra note 11, at 809-10; for further discussion
see infra note 117 and accompanying text.
14. Thirty states have adopted a "regulatory" approach that limits permissible attorney
advertising to specified categories of information. Many states also limit attorney advertis-
ing to only certain forms of media. See Andrews, supra note 11, at 809. For a discussion of
the "regulatory" approach, see uifra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
15. The Missouri attorney advertising rules allow an attorney to publish only 10 catego-
ries of information. Advertisements may be placed only in local print media. See Mo. Sup.
CT. R. 4. In addition, an addendum specified the terminology that can be used to describe
an attorney's "area of practice" and provides that a listing of an area of practice must be
accompanied by a disclaimer of expertise. See Mo. SUP. CT. R. 4, Addendum III (Adv.
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Recently, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitution-
ality of the revised Missouri rules in In re R.M.J 16 While finding these
rules unconstitutional, 7 the Court reassessed the scope of state power to
regulate attorney advertising." The appellant in AM.J was a member of
the Missouri bar who had recently opened a law office in St. Louis. To
announce the opening of his office, he placed several advertisements in
local newspapers and in the yellow pages. In addition, he mailed out pro-
fessional announcement cards to a preselected list of addressees.' 9 Upon
learning of these activities, the State Advisory Committee on Professional
Ethics and Responsibilities filed an information20 in the Missouri Supreme
Court that charged the appellant with violating the Missouri rules on attor-
ney advertising." The Missouri Supreme Court, in a divided opinion,
adopted the findings of the Advisory Committee and issued a private rep-
rimand.2 Defenses based on the first and fourteenth amendments were
summarily rejected by the court.2 3
The United States Supreme Court held that the Missouri rules violated
the free speech clause of the first amendment.2 4 The Court ruled that al-
though a state always has a substantial interest in protecting the public
from the potential deception that is inherent in attorney advertising,25 re-
strictions must be carefully drawn so as not to burden free speech unneces-
sarily.26 Thus, the standard emerging from R.MJ, while limiting the
ability of states to proscribe broad categories of attorney advertising, al-
lows some state regulation of all forms of such advertising.
Comm. Nov. 18, 1977), reprinted in 34 J. Mo. B. 51 (1978). See infra notes 121-25 and
accompanying text for a further discussion of the Missouri attorney advertising rules.
16. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
17. Id at 206-07.
18. Id
19. Id at 196.
20. An "information" is an accusation that a person has engaged in some form of crimi-
nal conduct, presented to the court without an indictment. BLAcKS LAw DICTIONARY (rev.
5th ed. 1979).
21. The appellant was charged with illegally publishing three advertisements that listed
the courts in which he was admitted to practice, described his areas of practice, used termi-
nology that was not approved by the state advisory committee, and that failed to include a
disclaimer along with his area of practice description. RMJ., 455 U.S. at 197-98. In addi-
tion, he was charged with impermissibly sending professional announcement cards to "per-
sons other than lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives." Id at 198
(quoting Mo. Sup. CT. R. 4, DR 2-102).
22. The Missouri Supreme Court provided only a cursory rationale for its decision. In
re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Mo. 1980).
23. Id
24. R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 207.
25. Id at 203.
26. Id
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This Note will discuss the development of attorney advertising prohibi-
tions, focusing on the traditional justifications for restraints. It will de-
scribe how the Court's decision in RM., while correctly limiting state
power to proscribe broad categories of attorney advertising, preserves an
outdated distinction between attorney advertising and other forms of com-
mercial speech. Finally, this Note will suggest that full application of gen-
eral commercial speech standards to attorney advertising is a more
reasoned alternative to the standard of review applied in RM.Jf.
I. TOTAL PROHIBITION OF ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
4. The Development of State Prohibition of Attorney Advertising
Although the legal profession traditionally has been opposed to lawyer
advertising, formal restrictions are relatively modern.27 The profession's
abstinence from advertising can be traced to medieval English rules of pro-
fessional etiquette.2" The close-knit legal fraternity of that time consisted
almost entirely of members of the aristocracy who regarded the law "as
primarily a form of public service in which the gaining of a livelihood was
but an incident."29 Rules against advertising, mostly unwritten, were re-
garded as a way of maintaining professional dignity.3° In addition, there
was a desire to protect the public from such abuses as barratry, 3' chain-
perty,32 and maintenance. 33
Having been incorporated into the traditions of the English legal profes-
sion, the practice of refraining from advertising was continued by the
27. The Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted by the ABA in 1908, included the first
written prohibition of attorney advertising applied to a large geographical area. See Com-
ment, Of Shibbolet/s, Sense and Changing Tradition--Lawyer Adyertising, 61 MARQ. L. Rv.
644, 645 n.5 (1978). For a discussion of the organized bar's traditional opposition to attor-
ney advertising, see generally Francis & Johnson, supra, note 3; Note, supra, note 3; H.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953).
28. One author suggests that one of the original justifications for the legal profession's
opposition to attorney advertising was to promote harmony within the profession. Because
in medieval England, lawyers often lived and trained together at the Inns of Court, competi-
tive advertising would have created friction among members of the bar. See H. DRINKER,
supra note 27, at 210.
29. Id at 210.
30. As stated by Drinker, "Many of the most desirable clients, imbued with high respect
both for their lawyer and his calling, would have no use for a lawyer who did not maintain
the dignity and standards of his profession." Id at 212.
31. "Barratry" is the offense of frequently stirring up quarrels and suits. BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
32. "Champarty" describes the situation in which a stranger agrees to carry on a suit for
one of the parties involved in return for a share of the eventual reward. Id
33. "Maintenance" is any attempt by a stranger to maintain, promote, or support the
litigations of another. Id
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founding members of the American bar who had trained in England.34
Under the guidance of these men, the practice of law was considered an
elite profession in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century
America.35 During this same period, however, a political climate that was
very hostile to professionalism began to emerge.36
By the middle of the nineteenth century, there existed a widespread be-
lief "that professions were undemocratic and un-American. ' '3' This atti-
tude greatly weakened the control that the organized bar had over the
legal profession." As the bar's control decreased, so did educational and
ethical standards for admission to the practice of law.39 Consequently,
corruption in the courts and among members of the legal profession in-
creased significantly.' By the post-Civil War period, the once exclusive
practice of law had been reduced in status to that of an ordinary trade.4'
It became apparent that a reorganization of the legal profession was nec-
essary. Bar associations were developed to regain the lost honor and dig-
nity of the profession. 42  These early bar associations raised the
educational standards for admission to the practice of law43 and formu-
lated ethical standards of attorney conduct." Modeled after English tradi-
tions, these early ethical rules contained provisions for the regulation, but
34. Early members of the American bar often trained at the English Inns of Court, then
returned to practice law in America. See H. DRINKER, supra note 27, at 210.
35. See Francis & Johnson, supra note 3, at 224.
36. Id
37. See Comment, supra note 27, at 645 (quoting 5 R. POTD, JURISPRUDENCE 679
(1959)).
38. For a discussion of the weakening of the organized bar during this period, see
Wickser, Bar Associations, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 390, 391-95 (1930).
39. In 1879, the first president of the Wisconsin Bar Association, Mr. Moses Strong,
commented:
The older of you can remember when nothing less than seven years study was
requisite to entitle an applicant to earn an examination for admission to the bar.
Now how changed! There are practically no prerequisites, of either knowledge of
laws, or knowledge of anything else, as conditions of admission to the bar.
Id at 395.
40. See Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 301, 304 (1970).
41. See Wickser, supra note 38, at 393-95.
42. The earliest bar associations were formed in the large urban centers where corrup-
tion was most acute. See Comment, supra note 40, at 304. The first bar association formed
was the Association of Bar of the City of New York. See Wickser, supra note 38, at 396.
The stated objective of this association was "to maintain the honor and dignity of the profes-
sion." Id From 1870 to 1878, 15 bar associations were formed for essentially this same
purpose. Id
43. See Comment, supra note 40, at 305.
44. Id
19831
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not the prohibition, of attorney advertising.45
Prohibition of virtually every form of advertising, however, was incor-
porated into the Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted by the American
Bar Association (ABA) in 1908.1 To protect the public from deceptive
practices and to promote professional dignity, canon 27 prohibited all
forms of attorney advertising, direct and indirect, except the customary use
of simple professional cards.47 This restrictive approach prohibited many
forms of advertising that had been permitted under the earlier rules and
considered proper by commentators of that time. 8
Canon 27 was redrafted in 1937 to allow publication of professional
cards in approved law lists.49 Later amendments enlarged the categories of
information that could be published in the approved lists.5° In addition,
some exceptions were made to allow recognized legal aid organizations
freedom to promote their services,5 but the names of the lawyers partici-
pating in such organizations could not be published.52 Thus, individual
45. See, e.g., Alabama State Bar Association Code of Ethics (1887), reprinted in H.
DRINKER, supra note 27, at 356.
46. The primary control over attorney advertising was contained in canon 27, which
stated: "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer,
and especially for his brother lawyer, is the establishment of a well merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of char-
acter conduct. .. ." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY No. 27 (1908) as
cited in H. DRINKER, supra note 27, at 215. Canon 27 continued by prohibiting every form
of attorney advertising except "ordinary simple business cards." Id
47. Id
48. See, e.g., G. WARVELLE, ESSAYS ON LEGAL ETHICS 57-63 (1902).
49. An approved law list was defined as follows: "[e]very list of attorneys at law, legal
directory or other imrtrumentality maintained or published primarily for the purpose of cir-
culating or presenting the name or names of any attorney or attorneys at law as probably
available for professional employment shall be deemed an approved law list." RULES AND
STANDARDS OF LAW LISTS R. 1 (1937) (amended 1941, 1942, 1944), reprinted in Sprecher,
EthicalAdvertiing and Solicitation Law Lists, 72 COM. L.J. 209 (1967).
50. Canon 27 was amended in 1937, 1940, 1942, 1943, and 1951. By 1951, canon 27
allowed publication of the following information: name, associate's names, telephone num-
bers, areas of practice, age, school attended, honors, legal publications, membership in vari-
ous organizations, and references. H. DRINKER, supra note 27, at 216.
51. The ABA Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances ruled on the
propriety of advertisements by bar associations. The committee, in one opinion, made it
clear that some advertising "which is calculated to teach laymen the benefits and advantages
of preventative legal services" would be permissible. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 179 (1938). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 148 (1935) (allowing the American Civil Liberties League
to Solicit clients to challenge new deal legislation); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 227 (1941) (allowing a local bar association to operate a lawyer
reference service) (modified by ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, For-
mal Op. 291) (1956)).
52. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 179, supra
[Vol. 32:729
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attorneys and groups not recognized as traditional legal aid societies re-
mained sharply constrained in their use of advertising means.
As a result of these advertising restrictions, the public received very lim-
ited information from the legal profession. Many people were unaware of
their legal rights and did not know how to go about securing competent
legal advice." When private groups were formed to help the public gain
access to needed legal information, the organized bar's ethical proscrip-
tions against advertising and solicitation often prevented such organiza-
tions from operating effectively.54
Recognizing these problems, the United States Supreme Court, in a se-
ries of decisions beginning with NAACP v. Button," upheld the rights of
legal assistance groups to solicit clients. In Button, the appellants, mem-
bers of the NAACP, were arrested and convicted for soliciting plaintiffs to
participate in school desegregation suits in violation of a Virginia antisolic-
itation statute based on canon 27.56 In reversing their convictions, the
Court held that "the activities of the NAACP . . . [are] protected by the
note 51; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 205
(1940) (permitting a local bar association to form a panel of lawyers willing to serve indigent
clients at a reduced fee provided that no lawyer's name was advertised).
53. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., President of the ABA from 1963 to 1964, recognized that: "far
too many persons are not able to obtain equal justice under the law. This usually results
because their poverty or their ignorance has prevented them from obtaining legal counsel."
Francis & Johnson, supra note 3, at 229 n.43. Powell, who dissented in Bates, authored the
RPM.J opinion. See infra notes 89, 177-94 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., In re Brotherhood of Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958)
(interest of railroad union in helping members prosecute personal injury claims held insuffi-
cient to allow the union to engage in solicitation for individual lawyers); Hildebrand v. State
Bar of Cal., 225 P.2d 508 (Cal. 1950) (participation by lawyers in labor union programs
designed to help members procure legal assistance held to be a violation of professional
ethics); In re Maclub of America, 3 N.E.2d 272 (Mass. 1936) (corporation which sold motor-
ists memberships entitling the motorists, among other benefits, to legal assistance for actions
arising out of ownership and operation of automobiles held to have illegally engaged in the
practice of law).
55. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Later decisions included: United Transp. Workers v. State Bar
of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971) (where the Court allowed a union not only to recommend and
retain attorneys, but also to transport the union members to the attorney's office and guaran-
tee that the fee charged would not be above 25% of the recovery); United Mine Workers v.
Illinois State Bar, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (extending to unions the right to retain lawyers to
handle members' claims); and Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar Ass'n, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (upholding the Trainmen Union's right to recommend lawyers
in work injury claims).
56. The antisolicitation statute in Button extended canon 27's prohibition against solici-
tation to any attorney who accepted employment in connection with an action from any
person who is not a party and who does not have a pecuniary interest in the proceeding.
Canon 27 also made it illegal for any person or group to solicit business for an attorney.
Button, 371 U.S. at 423-25.
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First and Fourteenth Amendments. '5 7 Thus, the Button decision ques-
tioned the constitutionality of the canon's broad ethical proscriptions as
applied to advertising by nontraditional legal service groups.
Anticipating the effect that Button would have on enforcement of its an-
tiadvertising policies, the ABA established a special committee to review
the Canons of Professional Ethics and to recommend appropriate
changes.58 As a result of the committee's efforts, the Canons were re-
drafted in 196959 and became part of the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (Code).60
The Code specifically recognized the need to make legal information
more available to the public.6' Lawyers were encouraged to participate in
group activities designed to educate laymen and to support programs
designed to make legal assistance more accessible.6 2 Nevertheless, individ-
ual attorney advertising designed to solicit clients was still considered un-
ethical.63 Disciplinary Rule 2-101 prohibited an attorney from advertising
in any form of "public communications" media.' Even the mailing of
professional announcement cards to prospective clients, a practice that had
not been formally prohibited by the Canons, was banned by the Code.65
These restrictions on attorney advertising were based upon the belief that
attorney advertising was inherently misleading and beneath the dignity of
the profession,"6 a view embodied in canon 27 and supported by the
courts.67 But these values were soon challenged by consumer groups and
57. Id at 428-29.
58. Board of Governors' Recommendation Re Creation of a Special Committee on Ethical
Standards, 89 ABA REP. 381, 383 (1964).
59. Report of Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94 ABA REP. 389,
392 (1969).
60. The new Code consisted of three interrelated components: general statements of
professional conduct, referred to as 'Canons"; aspirational objectives termed "Ethical Con-
siderations"; and mandatory guidelines of minimum conduct, called "Displinary Rules."
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry Preamble and Preliminary Statement
(1976).
61. Canon 2 of the Code states "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfil-
ling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY Canon 2 (1976).
62. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-1 to EC 2-8 (1976).
63. See supra note 4.
64. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (1976).
65. DR 2-102(A)(2) of the Code allowed only for the mailing of professional announce-
ment cards to "lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives." MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-102 (1976).
66. See supra note 4.
67. These values were expressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Braun, 293
A.2d 186 (1972). The defendant was a member of the New Jersey bar who, upon opening a
branch office to his existing firm, mailed announcement cards to approximately 1,000 area
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others interested in the beneficial informational aspects of attorney
advertising.
B. Total Bans on Attorney Advertising are Challenged
Traditionally, the bar has cited the need to protect the public as the
primary justification for bans on attorney advertising.6 8 The ever-increas-
ing concern for the development of more fully informed consumers during
the 1970's,69 however, eroded the legitimacy of this justification. One na-
tional survey found that 83% of the public believed that people refrained
from contacting attorneys because they could not determine which mem-
bers of the profession were competent to handle their particular legal prob-
lem.7° As it became increasingly clear that the advertising ban was not
necessarily in the public interest, the constitutional validity of the ban
came under attack in the courts.7 '
The constitutional argument against the advertising ban was based on
the United States Supreme Court's then recent extension of first amend-
ment protection to commercial speech in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council 72 The appellees in Virginia Phar-
residents. He was charged by the Ocean County Ethics Committee with violations of canon
27. Id at 187. By the time the case was brought to trial New Jersey had adopted the new
Model Code. The court held that it would not be in the public interest to advertise in this
manner because "the least capable lawyers would be apt to announce the most extravagant
claims and then resort to the worst means to make them good." Id at 188. See also, In re
Greathouse, 248 N.W. 739 (1935); Mayer v. State Bar, 39 P.2d 206 (Cal. 1934); People v.
MacCabe, 32 P. 280 (Col. 1893).
68. See supra note 4.
69. In justifying the proposed publication of a Virginia legal directory, Consumers
Union attorney Ellen Broadman summarized this attitude in 1974: "We proposed the direc-
tory in response to overwhelming evidence that people were not using legal services because
they weren't sufficiently informed of their rights and they couldn't find affordable counsel."
L. ANDERSON, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICrrATION 2 (1980).
70. B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NA-
TIoNAL. SURvEY 228 (1977).
71. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Consumers Union of
United States v. ABA, 427 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (re-
manded for reconsideration in light of Bates); Jacoby v. State Bar of Cal., 19 Cal. 3d 359,
562 P.2d 1326 (Cal. 1977).
72. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Prior to Virginia Pharmacy, commercial speech was considered
outside the domain of first amendment free speech protection. The so-called "commercial
speech exception" orginiated in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Chrestensen
involved a first amendment challenge to a municipal ordinance that prohibited the distribu-
tion of commercial leaflets on the streets of New York City. In upholding the constitutional-
ity of the ordinance, the Court held that "the Constitution imposes no. . . restraints. . . as
respects purely commercial advertising." Id at 54. The continued validity of this holding
was called into question in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
In Bigelow, the editor of a Virginia newspaper was convicted of a misdemeanor for pub-
19831
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macy, members of a consumers' union, challenged a Virginia statute that
prohibited pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription drugs.
The appellees asserted that first amendment free speech protections extend
to the consumer's right to receive a free flow of commercial information.73
Therefore, they contended that the ban on prescription advertising was
unconstitutional.74
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun acknowledged that consum-
ers have a first amendment interest in receiving accurate commercial infor-
mation.75 Justice Blackmun noted, however, that the state has a substantial
interest in regulating advertising by pharmacists, based on the need to
maintain a high level of professionalism. 76 The Court reconciled these
competing interests by employing a balancing test to weigh the first
amendment interests of the consumers against the state interest in regulat-
ing professional pharmacists. 77 The Court concluded that although a fun-
damental difference exists between commercial speech and ideological
speech, the first amendment precludes a state from completely suppressing
the dissemination of concededly truthful advertisements. 78 Virginia Phar-
lishing a proabortion advertisement. Id at 811. In overturning his conviction, the Court
suggested that purely commercial speech might be entitled to some first amendment protec-
tion. Id at 818-21. Because the decision was based on the advertisement's ideological con-
tent rather than its commercial content Chrestensen was not overruled. Id at 828-29.
Nevertheless, the Bigelow Court's suggestion that it might have been willing to extend to
advertisements limited first amendment protection independent of their ideological content
was a significant departure from precedent and a sign of a changing attitude toward com-
mercial speech.
73. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 753-54.
74. Id at 754.
75. The Court stated that "Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes
may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information ...." Since the dissemination of
commercial information is important to "private economic decisions," the Court reasoned
that advertising is entitled to some limited measure of first amendment protection. Id at
765.
76. Id at 766.
77. Because the state interest in protecting the public was determined to rest "on the
advantages of their being kept in ignorance," the Court found them inadequate to support
the prohibition. Id at 769. In evaluating the weight of the interests involved, the Court
noted: "It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information,
and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for
us." Id at 770.
78. The distinction between commercial speech and ideological speech was noted in a
footnote to the decision. Note 24 reads in pertinent part:
There are common sense differences between speech that does 'no more than pro-
pose a commercial transaction'.. . and other varieties. Even if the differences do
not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless. . . a different de-
gree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate
commercial information is unimpaired.
Id at 771 n.24 (citation omitted).
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macy was the first instance in which the Supreme Court recognized com-
mercial speech as a form of constitutionally protected communication."9
As such, Virginia Pharmacy represented a significant step in the develop-
ment of constitutional protection for attorney advertising.
Although the extension of first amendment protection to commercial
speech signalled that state power to regulate attorney advertising was abat-
ing, the Virginia Pharmacy decision did not address this specific issue. In a
footnote to the opinion, the Court indicated that the historical and func-
tional differences between attorneys and pharmacists might require consid-
eration of "quite different factors" if an attorney were to advertise.80 Since
attorneys do not sell a standardized product, the Court reasoned, there
would be an "enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they
were to undertake certain kinds of advertising."' l It was unclear, therefore,
whether attorney advertising would be entitled to first amendment protec-
tion under this newly formulated commercial speech doctrine.
C. The Extension of Limited First Amendment Protection to Attorney
Advertising
A challenge to attorney advertising based in part on first amendment
considerations, however, was soon before the Court. In Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, 2 the petitioners were members of the Arizona bar who had
advertised their fees for routine legal services in a Phoenix newspaper.
Such advertising violated the Arizona statutory attorney advertising ban. 3
The petitioners challenged the Arizona rules on the grounds that they vio-
lated both the Sherman Antitrust Act8" and the first amendment right of
free speech. The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected these challenges and
imposed disciplinary sanctions.8 5
79. See infra note 72.
80. 425 U.S. at 773 n.25.
81. Id
82. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
83. Arizona had incorporated DR 2-101(B) of the Model Code in Rule 29(a) of the
Supreme Court of Arizona as follows:
(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine
advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the
city or telephone directories or other means or commercial publicity, nor shall he
authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
433 U.S. at 355 (1977) (citing ARiZ. Sup. CT. R. 29).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
85. In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976), affd in part, rev'd in part, Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The court relied on the "state action" exemption
established in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), to hold that the advertising ban was
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in
part. 6 The Court unanimously upheld the Arizona Supreme Court's re-
jection of the antitrust challenge, 7 reasoning that the Arizona disciplinary
rules were exempt from federal antitrust regulation under the "state ac-
tion" exemption established in Parker v. Brown."s In a divided opinion,
however, the Court sustained the first amendment challenge, basing its de-
cision on the rights of consumers to receive a free flow of commercial in-
formation as established in Virginia Pharmacy.9
In sustaining the first amendment challenge, the Court rejected many of
the traditional justifications forwarded by the bar in opposition to advertis-
ing." The Court dismissed, for example, the claim that advertising would
have an adverse effect on professionalism on the grounds that such a claim
was inapplicable to modem society.91 Recognizing the original basis for
the bar's opposition to advertising, the Court concluded that "[s]ince the
immune from federal antitrust regulations. In re Bates, 555 P.2d at 643. See infra note 88
for a discussion of the "state action" exemption. In rejecting the constitutional attack, the
court noted that in Virginia Pharmacy the Supreme Court had expressly reserved judgment
on the question of whether attorney advertising was entitled to first amendment protection.
Id at 649. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
86. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
87. The Court held that the Arizona attorney advertising regulations were "shielded
from the Sherman Act by the state action exemption. Id at 357. See infra note 88 for
a discussion of the state action exemption.
88. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker involved a California raisin producer who brought suit
to enjoin the California Director of Agriculture from establishing a marketing program that
would restrict the sale of his raisins. In reversing the lower court's decision to issue the
injunction, the Supreme Court distinguished acts which are performed by state officials act-
ing under color of state law from acts of private individuals. The former were held immune
from federal antitrust regulations because the commerce clause, on which the antitrust regu-
lations are based, does not prohibit state regulation of local concerns. Id at 359, 368.
89. Bates, 433 U.S. at 363-85 (Burger, C.J., Stewart, Powell, & Rehnquist, J.J. dissent-
ing). Chief Justice Burger argued that Virginia Pharmacy was distinguishable because legal
services, unlike drugs, are not standardized products. Id at 386. He claimed that advertising
of legal services therefore "can never give the public an accurate picture on which to base its
selection of an attorney." Id at 386.
Justices Powell and Stewart joined in a separate dissent, also arguing that the standard-
ized product distinction should control. Id at 390-91. They contended that because legal
services are not standardized, attorney advertising will inevitably "mislead many who re-
spond to it." Id at 394 (Powell, J., dissenting).
In a lone dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that all commercial speech falls outside the
scope of first amendment protection. Id at 404-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. In all, the Court rejected six separate justifications advanced by the state to support
its advertising restrictions: (1) The adverse effect on professionalism, id at 368-72; (2) the
inherently misleading nature of attorney advertising, id at 372-75; (3) the adverse effect on
the administration of justice, id at 375-77; (4) the undesirable economic effects of advertis-
ing, id at 377-78; (5) the adverse effect of advertising on the quality of service, id. at 378-79;
and (6) the difficulties of enforcing less than a total ban, id at 379.
91. Id at 368-72. The Court noted that today many professionals, including bankers
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belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has become an anachro-
nism, the historical foundation for advertising restraint has crumbled." 92
A second justification for advertising restraint that was rejected by the
Bates Court was the contention that advertising of legal services would be
inevitably misleading to the public.93 The Court reasoned that this argu-
ment was based on the presumption that the public "is not sophisticated
enough to realize the limitations of advertising."94 This presumption was
seen as an underestimation of the public.9" But, even assuming this pre-
sumption to be valid, the Court concluded that the preferred remedy
would be more exposure, rather than less. 96
The Court also rejected claims that advertising would have adverse ef-
fects on the quality97 and price9 8 of legal services, and ultimately on the
administration of justice.99 Such claims, the Court reasoned, are unproven
and of questionable validity.co A final claim that the state would be un-
duly burdened by having to regulate closely attorney advertising if its total
ban was overturned was summarily rejected. 10' Finally, the court bal-
and engineers, advertise and that these professions are not considered undignified. Id at
369-70.
92. Id at 371-72. See supra notes 27-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
historical basis for attorney advertising restraints.
93. The state argued that the advertising of legal services would be inevitably
misleading:
(a) because such services are so individualized with regard to content and quality
as to prevent informed comparison on the basis of an advertisement, (b) because
the consumer of legal services is unable to determine in advance just what services
he needs, and (c) because advertising by attorneys will highlight irrelevant factors
and fail to show the relevant factor of skill.
Id at 372.
94. Id at 375.
95. The Court stated: "We suspect the argument rests on an underestimation of the
public." Id
96. Id
97. Advertising restrictions were seen as a particularly ineffective way of deterring
shoddy legal services. Id at 378.
98. The claim that advertising would have an undesirable economic impact on consum-
ers was dismissed because the advertising ban was found too anticompetitive. Thus, it was
reasoned that the advertising ban prevented consumers from effectively locating low cost
legal services and allowing market mechanisms to operate. Id at 377-78.
99. The claim, specifically, was that advertising would tend to promote increased litiga-
tion and thus have a detrimental effect on the judicial process. The Court counterbalanced
this assertion by relying on studies showing that information about legal services was sorely
needed by the public. Id at 376.
100. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
101. The Court reasoned that it was "at least somewhat incongruous for opponents of
advertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal profession at one point, and, at
another, to assert that its members will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort." 433
U.S. at 379.
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anced the beneficial impact that attorney advertising would have on public
access to legal information against all of the asserted adverse consequences
and concluded that the asserted consequences could not support total
proscription.10
2
Although the Bates Court clearly limited state power over attorney ad-
vertising, the final holding was extremely narrow."0 3 To emphasize the
limited scope of its decision, the Court specifically stated that states would
remain free to regulate certain types of attorney advertising. Advertising
that was false, misleading, or deceptive would continue to be subject to
state proscription." As with other types of commercial speech, reason-
able time, manner, and place restrictions would also be allowed." 5
To emphasize the narrowness of its holding further, the Bates Court ex-
pressly recognized some of the important questions left unanswered by its
decision. These included the permissibility of state prohibition of in-
person solicitation,"°e and the permissible scope of state regulation, short
of proscription, of attorney advertising.0 7 Therefore, although Bates was
the first case to limit expressly state power over individual attorney adver-
tising, the degree of first amendment protection actually extended to attor-
ney advertising remained vague.
II. MODERN REGULATIONS AND CHALLENGES
A. Revised Regulations
Following the Bates decision, the ABA established a task force to revise
its attorney advertising ban.'0" Within two months of the Bates decision,
the task force had formulated two proposed amendments to Disciplinary
Rule 2-101 of the Code,"° the provision that regulated attorney advertis-
ing. The two proposals differed significantly in terms of the degree of con-
trol that states would exercise over attorney advertising. The first,
102. Id
103. The Court stated: "The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the State
may prevent the publication in a newspaper of appellants truthful advertisement concerning
the availability and terms of routine legal services." Id at 384.
104. 1d at 383-86.
105. Id at 383-84.
106. Id
107. The Court specifically indicated that it had not addressed "advertising claims as to
the quality of services." Id at 383. In addition, the Court indicated that its present decision
did not foreclose states' imposition of warning and disclaimer requirements. Id at 384.
108. See Welsh, Bates, Ohralik, Primus-The First Amendment Challenge to Stale Regu-
lation of Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 585 (1978). A brief treat-
ment of the history behind the adoption of the revised rules is provided. Id at 600-03.
109. See Welsh, supra note 108, at 603.
[Vol. 32:729
Attorney Advertising
proposal A, was termed "regulatory" because it limited advertising to cer-
tain prespecified content. Proposal A contained a list of information that
an attorney would be permitted to include in an advertisement of legal
services.1 10 If an attorney published information that was not included on
the approved list, he or she would be subject to disciplinary action. 1 '
Proposal B, in contrast, was described as "directive," because it only
prohibited advertisements that were "false, fraudulent, misleading, or de-
ceptive." 112 Some guidelines for determining when an advertisement was
deceptive were included, but these were general in form." 3 Therefore,
under proposal B, an attorney would be much freer to choose the types of
information to be included in his or her advertisement. Discipline would
be imposed only if the advertisement was actually found to be false or
deceptive." 4 Ultimately, the ABA adopted proposal A." 5 Both propos-
als, however, were circulated to individual states to be considered for
adoption into state law." 6
Because the Bates Court had left the scope of permissible state regula-
tion of attorney advertising unclear, the rules eventually adopted by the
states varied widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. A minority of juris-
dictions adopted proposal B type regulations that allow attorneys to utilize
more fully available advertising means." 7 The majority of states, how-
ever, adopted versions of proposal A." 8 In general, these regulations spec-
ify what forms of attorney advertising will be allowed and prohibit any
110. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (Proposal A Discussion
Draft 1977), reprinted in Welsh, supra note 108, at 600-01. Among the items included were:
name, field of practice, birthdate, date of admission to the bar, schools attended, public or
quasi public offices held, legal authorships, fees for initial consultations, range of fees, and
hourly rate. Id
Ill. Id
112. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (Proposal B Discussion
Draft), reprinted in Welsh, supra note 108, at 602-03.
113. For example, under Proposal B, an advertisement is considered misleading if it:
contains a misinterpretation of fact; fails to state any material fact necessary to make the
statement, in light of all circumstances, not misleading; is intended or likely to create an
unjustified expectation; or appeals primarily to a layperson's fear, greed, desire for revenge,
or similar emotions. Id
114. Id
115. See Welsh, supra note 108, at 603.
116. Id
117. Eg., District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY
STATE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter cited as
CODE BY STATE] (comparing the Model Code of Professional Responsibility with each state
code of professional responsibility).
118. E.g., Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennes-
1983]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 32:729
variation therefrom." 9 But the regulations of this group differ from state
to state in terms of the content, format, and form of media that are
permissible.' 2
The Supreme Court of Missouri adopted one of the most restrictive of
the proposal A type regulations. 2 ' The Missouri rules list ten specific cat-
egories of information that may be included in a legal advertisement and
prohibit the inclusion of any additional information. 22 Attorney adver-
tisements may be placed only in "newspapers, periodicals, and the yellow
pages of telephone directories."' 123 In an addendum, the terminology that
see, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See CODE BY STATE, supra
note 117.
119. See, e.g., MO. SuP. CT. R. 4 DR 2-101, infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
120. Some permit print media advertising only, e.g., Missouri, Connecticut, and Dela-
ware. Others permit radio but not television, e.g., Indiana, Nebraska, and Wyoming. Fi-
nally, some jurisdictions allow advertising in all media forms, e.g, Colorado, Georgia, and
North Carolina. See CODE BY STATE, supra note 117.
121. MO. SuP. CT. R. 4 DR 2-101.
122. The Missouri rules allowed a lawyer to publish the following information:
(1) Name, including name of law firm and names of professional associates, ad-
dresses and telephone numbers;
(2) One or more particular areas or fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm
practices if authorized by and using designations and definitions authorized for
that purpose by The Advisory Committee;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Schools attended, with dates of graduation and degrees;
(5) Foreign language ability;
(6) Office hours;
(7) Fee for an initial 30-minute consultation;
(8) Availability upon request of a schedule of fees;
(9) Credit arrangements for payment of fees will be given consideration;
(10) The fixed fee to be charged for the following specific routine legal services:
1. An uncontested dissolution of marriage;
2. An uncontested adoption;
3. An uncontested personal bankruptcy;
4. An uncomplicated change of name;
5. A simple warranty or quitclaim deed;
6. A simple deed of trust;
7. A simple promissory note;
8. An individual Missouri or federal income tax return;
9. A simple power of attorney;
10. A simple will;
11. Such other services as may be approved by The Advisory Committee; the
description of which would not be misunderstood or be deceptive, provided that
the statement discloses that the quoted fee will be available only to clients whose
matters fall into the services described and that the client is entitled without obliga-
tion to a specific estimate of the fee likely to be charged in print size at least
equivalent to the largest print used in setting forth the fee information.
ld
123. Id
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an attorney may use in advertising his area of practice is specified.' 24 In
addition, the addendum requires that any listing of an area of practice be
accompanied by a disclaimer of certified expertise. 25 Because the Mis-
souri rules prohibit advertisements that are entirely truthful and nondecep-
tive, their constitutional validity has been questioned almost from their
inception. 2
6
B. Post-Bates Challenges
Until recently, the constitutionality of state "regulatory" rules, including
those of Missouri, has escaped review by the United States Supreme Court.
124. The addendum reads in pertinent part:
I. 'General Practice'
2. 'General Criminal Practice'
3. 'General Civil and Criminal Practice'
If a lawyer or law firm uses one of the above, no other area can be used. . . . If
one of the above is not used, then a lawyer or law firm can use one or more of the
following:
I. 'Adminsitrative Law'
2. 'Anti-Trust Law'
3. 'Appellate Practice'
4. 'Bankruptcy'
5. 'Commercial Law'
6. 'Corporation Law and Business Organizations'
7. 'Criminal Law'
8. 'Eminent Domain Law'
9. 'Environment Law'
10. 'Family Law'
11. 'Financial Institution Law'
12. 'Insurance Law'
13. 'International Law'
14. 'Labor Law'
15. 'Local Government Law'
16. 'Military Law'
17. 'Probate and Trust Law'
18. 'Property Law'
19. 'Public Utility Law'
20. 'Taxation Law'
21. 'Tort Law'
22. 'Trial Practice'
23. 'Workers Compensation.'
No deviation from the above phraseology will be permitted and no statement of
limitation of practice can be stated.
If one or more of these specific areas of practice are used in any advertisement,
the following statement must be included . . . : 'Listing of the above areas of
practice does not indicate any certification of expertise therein.'
Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4 Addendum III (Adv. Comm. Nov. 18, 1977), reprinted in 34 J. Mo. B. 1
(1978).
125. Id
126. See Welsh, supra note 108, at 612.
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The Court provided some guidance as to the scope of permissible state
regulation of attorney advertising by its decisions in related areas of the
law. The permissibility of state proscription of in-person solicitation by
lawyers, a question specifically left open in Bates, was upheld. 2 7 The
Court also allowed state prohibition of professional advertisements when
there is a demonstrated history of abuse.' s Finally, a new analysis was
formulated for commercial speech that appears to require a more precise
balance of the competing interests involved.'29 These decisions, while not
specifically overruling the state "regulatory" rules, when read together,
cast doubt on their constitutional validity.'3°
L Attorney Solicitation
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,131 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed state prohibition of in-person solicitation. In Ohralik, an Ohio at-
torney had solicited the business of two automobile accident victims while
they were hospitalized. Both agreed to his representation but later dis-
charged him and filed a complaint with the local bar grievance commit-
tee. 132 A state disciplinary board charged the lawyer with violation of the
Ohio statutory rules forbidding in-person solicitation. 3 3  The Ohio
Supreme Court adopted the board's findings and issued an indefinite
suspension. 13
4
The United States Supreme Court upheld the sanction, 135 reasoning that
the -person solicitation of clients poses significant potential public harm
127. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). For a discussion of this
decision, see infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
128. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979). For a discussion of this decision, see
infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
129. See Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The new
commercial speech analysis requires that for any nonmisleading commercial speech to be
subject to state regulation, the state must first assert a substantial interest justifying the regu-
lation. Then, the state must show that the regulation is narrowly drawn to promote the
asserted interest without burdening the flow of commercial information any more than is
reasonably necessary. Id at 561-66. For a further discussion of this decision, see infra notes
151-65 and accompanying text.
130. See Welsh, supra note 108, at 611.
131. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
132. Id at 453.
133. DR 2-103(A) of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility provided in relevant
part: "A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practioner, of himself, his
partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment
of a lawyer." OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, as amended by Ohio Sup. Ct.
Order effective Nov. 28, 1977.
134. Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 48 Ohio St. 2d 217, 357 N.E.2d 1097 (1976).
135. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455.
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that does not exist in other professional advertising. 36  Distinguishing
Bates, the Court noted the private nature of in-person solicitation and con-
sequent difficulties in post-hoc proof of wrongdoing. 137 However, it was
the "potential for overreaching that is inherent in a lawyer's in-person so-
licitation of professional employment,"' 38 demonstrated by the facts in
Ohralik, the Court concluded, that justified state imposition of proscriptive
regulations. 139 Thus, the difference in treatment between attorney advertis-
ing and in-person solicitation, implied by the Bates Court, was made ex-
press in Ohralik.
2 Professional Use of Trade Names
Although professional advertising is considered less dangerous than in-
person solicitation, the Court has allowed a state to prohibit the use of
trade names in professional advertising when there is a demonstrated his-
tory of their deceptive use. In Friedman v. Rogers,"4 the petitioner, an
optometrist, challenged a Texas law that forbade the use of "trade names"
by optometrists. 4 ' The rule was designed to prevent optometrists from
purchasing the practices of other optometrists and continuing the practice
under a trade name. 142 In Texas, large commercial chains of optometrist
shops had developed, with all of the shops in an individual chain practic-
ing under the same trade name in an attempt to convey the impression of
uniform care. 143 Rogers, who owned eighty-two shops, brought an action
in federal district court, claiming that the law violated his first and four-
teenth amendment rights.' 44 The district court employed a balancing test
to sustain Roger's challenge, concluding that the first amendment rights of
the optometrist precluded state prohibition of his use of trade names.
45
136. Id at 464-66.
137. Id at 466. The:Court reasoned that because in-person solicitation is usually a pri-
vate transaction between the lawyer and the prospective client, it is often difficult to obtain
reliable proof of what actually took place. Id
138. Id at 468. The Court argued that the dangers of overreaching, recognized in the
face-to-face selling of ordinary consumer goods, "is significantly greater when a lawyer, a
professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured,
or distressed lay person." Id at 464-65.
139. Id. at 468.
140. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
141. Id at 6.
142. Id. at 14-15.
143. Id
144. Rogers v. Friedman, 438 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Tex. 1977).
145. The district court found that the state interests in preserving the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, maintaining the standards of quality eye care, and protecting against the inherent
potential for deception that is involved in practicing under an assumed name did not out-
weigh Roger's right to commercial free speech. Id
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The United States Supreme Court reversed."4 The first amendment
protection that it had recently extended to commercial speech in Bates 47
and Virginia Pharmacy4" was held to be inapplicable because trade
names, unlike price information, have no intrinsic meaning and thus pres-
ent a greater potential for abuse.'4 9 In addition, the Court noted that there
was a demonstrable history of deceptive trade name use in Texas.'5 Thus,
the Court in Ohralik and Rogers suggested that when the inherent or
proven potential for public harm was greater than in Bates, states would
be permitted to prohibit advertising and solicitation practices. Neverthe-
less, it remained unclear what measures states could take, short of prohibi-
tion, in an attorney advertising case in which there was no special
increased potential for public harm.
3. A New Commercial Speech Standard
Although the scope of state authority to regulate attorney advertising
remained vague, the permissible limit of state regulation of general com-
mercial speech was determined by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson
Gas v. Public Service Commission.151 In Central Hudson, the Supreme
Court developed an analytical framework that significantly clarified the
degree of protection to be afforded commercial speech.'5 2 The regulation
challenged in CentralHudson was a New York Public Service Commission
prohibition of all advertisements "intended to stimulate the purchase of
utility services."15 3 The state justified the ban both as part of the national
effort to conserve energy and as a method of preventing increases in the
state's utility rates. Central Hudson, a New York public utility company,
challenged the prohibition in state courts but was unsuccessful at all levels
of review.' 4
146. Rogers, 440 U.S. at 19.
147. See supra notes 82-107 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
149. The Court, in distinguishing the prior commercial speech cases, stated "Here, we
are concerned with a form of commercial speech that has no intrinsic meaning." Because
any meaning that a trade name may have acquired through association with price and quali-
ty of a particular service, and because this association can be manipulated by the merchant,
"there is a significant possibility that trade names will be used to mislead the public." Rog-
ers, 440 U.S. at 13-15.
150. Id at 17-18.
151. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
152. See infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
153. CentraltHudson, 447 U.S. at 559.
154. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 63 A.D.2d 364, 407 N.Y.S.2d
735, afd, 47 N.Y.2d 94, 390 N.E.2d 749, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1979). The New York Supreme
Court found that the compelling state interest in energy conservation outweighed the as-
serted first amendment interests. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 738. The court of appeals held that corn-
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed in a divided opin-
ion.15 Consistent with Virginia Pharmacy, the Court stated that commer-
cial speech was not entitled to the same level of constitutional protection as
ideological speech.'56 Nevertheless, "the informational function of adver-
tising" requires that commercial speech be given some protection.' 57 To
test the permissibility of the New York regulation against this protection,
the Court set forth a four part analysis. 58
Because the protection afforded commercial speech is based on the right
of the consumer to have free access to information,'59 the first step in the
Central Hudson test is to determine whether the commercial message is
more likely to deceive than inform."m6 If so, it is not entitled to any first
amendment protection.' 6 ' If the message is informative, however, the sec-
ond step requires the state to show a substantial interest to support any
restriction.' 62 Assuming a substantial state interest, the third step requires
that the restriction must directly, as opposed to "remotely," advance that
interest. 163 Finally, that restriction must be narrowly drawn so as not to
hinder the flow of information any more than is reasonably necessary to
mercial speech was entitled to a lower level of constitutional protection when the
disseminator is a noncompetitive entity which can only incidentally affect private economic
decisionmaking. 390 N.E.2d at 757-58.
155. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion. He was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall, Stewart and White. Justice Blackmun
concurred in the judgment but expressed dissatisfaction with the limited protection that the
majority's analysis afforded commercial speech. Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment). Accurate commercial speech, he reasoned, should be protected from state sup-
pression, absent only a "clear and present danger." Id at 575. Justice Stevens concurred on
the narrower ground that the public utility's advertising ban infringed on more than purely
commercial speech. Id, at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). He therefore found
the ban over-inclusive. Id at 580. In a sole dissent, Justice Rehnquist found the majority
analysis overly protective of commercial speech. Id at 584-85 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
He argued that the new analysis was "virtually undistinguishable" from the protection af-
forded noncommercial expression. Id at 591. He reasoned that the "concededly substantial
state interest" of energy conservation outweighed the concern for a "free flow of informa-
tion." Id at 588-606. Accordingly, he concluded that the Court's holding therefore in-
truded upon the state's legitimate power of economic regulation. Id at 605-06.
156. This distinction, according to the Court is based on "the 'commonsense' distinction
between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally
subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech." Central Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 562 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56).
157. Id. at 563.
158. See infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
159. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
160. Id
161. Id at 564.
162. Id
163. Id
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promote the asserted state interest. 64
Using this analytical framework, the Court struck down the New York
ban.' 65 Because the subject matter addressed in Central Hudson did not
concern attorney advertising, however, the application of the newly formu-
lated test to this area remained uncertain. As the decisions in Bates and
Virginia Pharmacy had indicated, there clearly was a difference between
the treatment given to attorney advertising and that given commercial ad-
vertising in general.' 66 The Court based this difference on what it per-
ceived to be a greater potential for deception in attorney advertising. 67
Although the Central Hudson Court did not indicate whether this justifica-
tion would be taken into account by its new standard, the issue was soon
before the Court in In re R.M.J 168
III. IvRE M..
4. The Supreme Court's New Attorney Advertising Standard
The appellant in R.M.J was a St. Louis attorney who had inadvertently
violated the Missouri attorney advertising rules. In his efforts to publicize
the opening of his law office, he had mailed professional announcement
cards to a preselected list of people and law firms. In addition, he had
placed several advertisements in the local newspapers and yellow pages.
These advertisements, although entirely truthful, contained information
and descriptive terminology that were not permitted under the Missouri
rules.' 69 The publicity, which described his areas of practice, also failed to
provide a disclaimer of expertise, as required by a recent statutory adden-
dum. 171 On the basis of these promotional activities, the state Advisory
Committee on Professional Ethics and Responsibilities filed an informa-
164. Id at 566. The Court indicated that it would not allow any state restriction on
commercial speech to stand if the state could achieve the same result by a less instrusive
restriction. Id at 571-72.
165. Id at 566-71.
166. In Bates, the Court stated that the public's lack of knowledge about legal services
and the lack of a standardized "product" made control of deceptive attorney advertising
more necessary than control of inaccuracy in a general commercial message. Bates, 433 U.S.
at 383-84.
In Virginia Pharmacy the Court indicated that the historical difference between the profes-
sions and the lack of standardized legal "product" might make the general commercial
speech protection inapplicable to "certain types of advertising" by attorneys. Virginia Phar-
macy, 425 U.S. at 773 n.25.
167. Id., 425 U.S. at 773.
168. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
169. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevant Mis-
souri rules.
170. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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tion 7 in the Supreme Court of Missouri, charging unprofessional conduct
and seeking disbarment." 2 In response, the attorney argued that the Mis-
souri rules unconstitutionally violated his freedom of speech under the
new commercial speech standard established in Central Hudson .73
The Supreme Court of Missouri, in a divided opinion, upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Missouri rules.' 74 However, the majority provided only a
cursory opinion to support its decision. The majority simply stated that
when the Missouri rules were carefully revised after the Bates decision,
there was every reason to believe that they would be constitutional,17 5 and
refused to discuss the application of the Central Hudson test.' 76 Thus
framed, the Supreme Court was presentd with a clear opportunity to deter-
mine how its new commercial speech standard would apply to attorney
advertising restrictions.
The United States Supreme Court in RM.J., applying a refined version
of the Central Hudson test, held the Missouri rules to be unconstitu-
tional. ' Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous Court, began by describ-
ing how the narrow holding in Bates had extended only limited
commercial speech protection to attorney advertising. 18 The Bates Court,
it was emphasized, had expressly allowed attorneys only "to advertise the
fees they charge for 'routine' legal services." 79 The Court then explained
why attorney advertising should be entitled to less first amendment protec-
tion than other forms of commercial speech.
First, as it had done in the Bates decision, the Court assumed the pub-
171. See supra note 20.
172. The information charged that R.M.J. had listed areas.of practice not specified in the
addendum, listed information that was not included on the approved list, and had not in-
cluded the required disclaimer of expertise. In addition, it was charged that the mailing of
professional cards to prospective clients was in violation of rules that specified the permissi-
ble use of professional announcement cards. R.M.J, 455 U.S. at 198.
173. Id at 198. See supra notes 151-67 and accompanying text.
174. In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1980). Chief Justice Bardgett dissented, reason-
ing that the defendant's conduct was not unethical, and that the Missouri rules should be
interpreted as suggested guidelines rather than mandatory restrictions. In addition, he be-
lieved that Central Hudson would not fully apply to attorney advertising. Judge Sciler, in a
separate dissent, argued that Central Hudson was applicable, and that its application made
the Missouri restrictions unconstitutional.
175. Id. at 412.
176. The majority stated "[wje respectfully decline to enter the thicket of attempting to
anticipate and to satisfy the subjective ad hoc judgments of a majority of the justices of the
United States Supreme Court." Id
177. RMJ., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
178. Justice Powell, who dissented in Bates noted that the extension of first amendment
protection to attorney advertising was limited by the narrowness of the Bates decision. Id
at 200. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
179. RMJ., 455 U.S. at 199.
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lic's lack of legal knowledge.180 This lack of knowledge, the Court rea-
soned, increases the potential for deception in legal advertising.' The
Court stated that together with the public's lack of knowledge, "the limited
ability of the professions to police themselves and the absence of any
standardization in the 'product"' cause attorney advertising to be poten-
tially more deceptive than other forms of commercial speech. 8 2 There-
fore, the Court concluded that attorney advertising is potentially more
harmful to the public.'
Next, the Court distinguished the methods that are available to a state to
control potential harm from those that are available to prevent actual
harm: advertising that is deceptive and therefore actually harmful to the
public may be prohibited entirely by a state.'8 4 But, noting the Bates deci-
sion, the Court said that "the state may not place an absolute prohibition
on certain types of potentially misleading information." ''5 According to
the R.M.J Court, however, even though a:torney advertising is not actu-
ally misleading, the state retains some authority to regulate. Perceiving a
strong potential for deception and confusion, the Court implied that some
restrictions will be allowed over all forms of attorney advertising, 8 6 so
long as the restrictions are "no broader than reasonably necessary to pre-
vent the deception."'87
180. The Court stated that "[b]ecause the public lacks sophistication concerning legal
services, misstatements that might be overlookd or deemed unimportant in other advertis-
ing, may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising." Id at 200 (quoting Bates, 433
U.S. at 383).
181. Id at 200-02.
182. Id at 202.
183. Id
184. Id at 203.
185. Id
186. The Court summarized the commercial speech doctrine, in the 'ontext of attorney
advertising, as follows:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the
First Amendment. But when the particular content or method of the advertising
suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact
such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions.
Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the States may not place an
absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information, e.g., a
listing of areas of practice, if the information also may be presented in a way that is
not deceptive. Thus, the Court in Bates suggested that the remedy in the first in-
stance is not necessarily a prohibition but preferably a requirement of disclaimers
or explanation. . . . Although the potentialfor deception and confusion is particu-
larly strong in the context of adversing professional services, restrictions upon such
advertising may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the deception.
Id (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
187. Id
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Before applying these generalizations to Missouri's attorney advertising
rules, the Court determined that the constitutionality of the disclaimer
requirement was not before the Court. 8 ' Then, applying its new attor-
ney advertising standard, the Court struck down Missouri's attorney ad-
vertising restrictions that specified permissible advertising content and
terminology 189 and controlled the distribution of professional announce-
ment cards."9° The Court noted that there was no claim that any of
R.M.J.'s communications were actually misleading.' 9 ' Nor could it find
that any were inherently misleading. 192 Although it had determined that
states retain some authority to regulate all forms of attorney advertising, 9
3
the Court held that the Missouri regulations were overly broad and there-
fore unconstitutional' 
94
B. The Implications of the RM.J Decision
The final holding in RM.J is well supported. The Missouri attorney
advertising restrictions prohibited the dissemination of essentially the
same type of truthful information concerning the availability of legal serv-
ices that had been protected in Bates.195 In addition to the Supreme Court,
other courts' 96 and many commentators 97 have recognized a legitimate
188. R.M.J.'s counsel had stated that "[tihe disciplinary action was not based on a failure
to include the disclaimer." Id at 204 n. 18. In fact, the Court indicated that a requirement
of disclaimer or explanation may be allowed on all forms of attorney advertising. Id at 203.
189. Id at 205.
190. Id at 206.
191. Id at 205.
192. Id at 205-06.
193. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
194. The Court concluded:
[Ajlthough the States may regulate commercial speech, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments require that they do so with care and in a manner no more extensive
than necessary to further substantial interests. The absolute prohibition on appel-
lant's speech, in the absence of a finding that his speech was misleading, does not
meet these requirements.
A.M.., 455 U.S. at 207.
195. In both Bates and R-M.., the advertisements contained truthful information about
the availability of legal services. See supra notes 82-83, 169 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219,1227 (S.D.
Iowa 1981), vacated, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982); (In deciding whether an attorney could
include information as to his race in an advertisement, the court stated "[Sluch information
can serve a useful purpose"); Durham v. Brock, 498 F. Supp. 213, 225 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
("Listing the area of one's practice or the availability of routine legal services is information
which is valuable to the consumer."); Matter of Discipline of Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204, 212
(Minn. 1981) ("The attorney's right to speak and associate freely and the public's right to
receive commercial information ... are substantial. .. ").
197. See authorities cited, supra notes 27, 69, 70, 108; Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and
the First Amendment, 191 A.B.F. RESEARCH J. 967; Iinenberger & Murdock, Legal Service
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public interest in this type of information. Finally, the brief Missouri
Supreme Court opinion had provided little basis to support the Missouri
regulations against these substantial interests.198
The attorney advertising standard enunciated by the Court in RM.J,
however, rests on the premise that attorney advertising is potentially more
harmful to the public than other forms of commercial speech199 because it
has a greater potential for deception.2 "o In accepting this argument, the
Supreme Court has apparently created a different and less exacting stan-
dard of review for attorney advertising than it had provided for all other
forms of commercial speech in CentralHudson.201 Yet, the assumptions" 2
on which the Court's rationale ultimately rest provide little support for an
analytical distinction in first amendment protection between attorney ad-
vertising and other types of commercial speech.
The first of these assumptions is that the public lacks sophistication
about legal services and is therefore especially susceptible to deceptive at-
torney advertising.2 °0 Although the public's lack of legal knowledge had
been recognized by the Court in Bates,' the Court expressly rejected the
conclusion that attorney advertising would inevitably mislead the pub-
lic.20 5 Significantly the Bates Court had stated that the argument "assumes
that the public is not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of ad-
vertising" and therefore likely rests on an "underestimation of the
public."2°6
The Bates Court's tentative confidence in the American consumer is
Advertising: Wyoming Attorney Attitudes Compared with Wyoming Consumer Attitudes, 17
LAND & WATER L. REv. 209 (1982).
198. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
199. The Court stated that attorney advertising is "especially susceptible to abuses."
A.MJ., 455 U.S. at 202.
200. The Court stated: "[Tlhe CentralHudon formulation must be applied to advertis-
ing for professional services with the understanding that the special characteristics of such
services afford opportunities to mislead and confuse that are not present when standardized
products or services are offered to the public." Id at 203-04 n.15.
201. In Central Hudson, the state was required to assert a substantial interest before any
restriction of commercial speech would be tolerated. CentraltHudson, 447 U.S. at 564. How-
ever, in AM.J the state was assumed to have a substantial interest in controlling the poten-
tial deception that was found to be inherent in attorney advertising. See supra notes 186-87
and accompanying text.
202. These assumptions are the public's lack of legal knowledge, the limited ability of the
profession to police itself, and the lack of any standardization in the legal "product."
RMJ., 455 U.S. at 202.
203. Id at 202.
204. See supra note 180.
205. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
206. Bates, 433 U.S. at 374-75.
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supported by research on the consumer decisionmaking process.2"7 Al-
though advertising is often effective in creating public awareness and inter-
est, consumers seldom make important decisions based on advertising
alone .2 0  Generally, consumers rely on word-of-mouth sources to "supple-
ment, verify, and reinforce (or refute) information gathered through the
mass media.''2"" Even when the exigencies of a legal situation force a con-
sumer to select a lawyer on the basis of advertising, it is unusual for the
consumer not to verify the selection through alternative sources. 2 '0 Thus,
the potential for deception that the AM.J Court feared would result from
a legally unsophisticated consumer's exposure to a truthful legal advertise-
ment is greatly minimized by the consumer's decisionmaking process.
The public is in greater danger when the particular form or method of
advertisement is actually deceptive. It is well recognized that a state has a
legitimate interest in protecting consumers from the harm that is likely to
result from such deception.21 Regardless of public familiarity with the
product advertised, however, deceptive advertisements may be totally
banned under the general commercial speech standard enunciated in Cen-
tral Hudson.212 Therefore, under the Central Hudson standard, the public
may be effectively protected from legal advertisements that are actually
deceptive.
The second justification utilized by the RM.J Court to support its ana-
lytical distinctions is the legal profession's alleged limited ability to police
itself.2 3 The adequacy of the Central Hudson standard cannot be dis-
counted on this basis, however. The organized bar has demonstrated a
207. See Murdock & Linenberger, LegalAdvertising and Solicitation, 16 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 627, 671-73 (1981). The authors summarize research that has been done on the
consumer decisionmaking process to refute the assertions that attorney advertising is decep-
tive and that consumers are not sophisticated enough to benefit from such advertising; but cf.
J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 200 (1967) (expressing the view that advertis-
ing can broadly influence consumer choices, both within and across industries).
208. Consumers generally go through a "hierarchy of steps" before making the actual
commercial decision. One model suggests that the steps are: attention, interest, desire, ac-
tion. See Murdock & Linenberger, supra note 207, at 671-72 n.246.
209. Id at 672.
210. Id
211. The first amendment protection extended to commercial speech in Virginia Phar-
macy is based on the consumer's right to receive accurate commercial information. Virginia
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-64. Thus, no such protection exists if the advertisement is false
or deceptive. Id at 771-72. The state's right to prohibit such deceptive advertising has not
been seriously questioned.
212. The Court in Central Hudson stated: "[Tlhere can be no constitutional objection to
the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about law-
ful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the
public than inform it." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
213. RM.., 455 U.S. at 202.
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consistent concern for policing its members with respect to attorney adver-
tising.2 4 Both the Canons of Professional Ethics2 5 and the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility2" 6 contain proscriptions against attorney
advertising based on the bar's concern for protecting the public from de-
ception. Since other forms of commercial speech generally are not subject
to any "policing" scrutiny, it is difficult to discern why the Court expressed
a concern for the organized bar's alleged limited ability to police attorney
advertising. The expression of this concern, one that has not arisen with
regard to other forms of commercial speech, is a clear indication of the
Court's belief in the dangers inherent in attorney advertising, but it is not a
justification for that belief.
The Court's third justification was that the lack of standardization in
legal services increases the potential for deception in attorney advertis-
ing.217 Yet a decreased level of scrutiny is not necessarily supported by this
argument. The inherent assumption in this assertion is that the public is
unable to comprehend the limitations of advertising. This argument, like
the lack of public knowledge argument, ignores the decisionmaking pro-
cess of consumers when selecting legal counsel. 218 This justification is fur-
ther undercut by studies demonstrating that it is not financially beneficial
for the seller of a nonstandardized product to engage in deceptive advertis-
ing.2'9 Because the start-up costs of developing an advertising program are
high, these costs can only be recouped by repeat business.220 The financial
benefit gained from initial public exposure through deception is quickly
lost by a decrease in follow-up business, as individual consumers become
aware of deceptive practices.22' Thus, none of the three assumptions that
the R.MJ Court used to justify increased state authority over attorney
advertising can adequately support such a result.
214. See supra notes 47-54, 58-67 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 46.
216. See supra notes 2, 4.
217. R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 202.
218. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
219. In a theoretical analysis of the economic value of advertising, it has been suggested
that all goods and services can be classified into either "search" or "experience" goods.
Standardized products like clothes, furniture, and groceries are "search" goods. Consumers
tend to rely on advertising claims to determine the quality of these types of goods. However,
legal services would fall into the category of experience goods. The quality of "experience"
goods is judged only after the consumer has had a chance to actually use the product or
service. Therefore, advertising claims as to the value and quality of legal services would
actually have less effect on consumers than advertising claims as to the quality of standard-
ized products. See Khactu, Advertising, Market Power and the Public Interest: The Lawyer's
Case, 55 N.D.L. REV. 525, 529 (1979).
220. Id at 529.
221. Id
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In addition, an increased level of state restraint over attorney advertising
defies the public policy behind the elimination of advertising restraints. In
Virginia Pharmacy, the basis for the elimination of advertising restraints
was to allow people to gain access to commercial information so that they
could make more informed consumer choices.222 The strongest attacks on
governmental restraints of attorney advertising have come from attorneys
interested in achieving the same result.223 Studies conducted after the
Bates decision have shown that the public's need for adequate information
on the availability of legal services has not been fully met.224 Despite the
continuing need, the RM.J analysis provides attorney advertising with
less than full commercial speech protection.
Full commercial speech scrutiny would not interfere with a state's abil-
ity to prohibit attorney advertising practices that are actually deceptive.225
State imposed restraints on truthful attorney advertising, however, would
have to be supported by a substantial state interest. 226 A state could meet
this burden if it could show that a particular attorney's advertisement has a
significant potential for deception.227 Absent such a showing, restrictions
on that advertisement would be difficult to support. Thus, full commercial
speech scrutiny would provide attorneys with freer access to the media and
would give states firmer constitutional guidelines upon which to base their
regulations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The RM.J decision defines the degree of first amendment protection to
be afforded attorney advertising. The new attorney advertising analysis,
unlike the general commercial speech standard enunciated in Central Hud-
son, implies that states have a per se substantial interest in regulating all
forms of commercial speech by attorneys, requiring only that the regula-
tion be narrowly drawn. Although categorical prohibitions of truthful
222. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 753, 754.
223. See Bates, 433 U.S. 350, R.M.., 455 U.S. 191.
224. See Smith & Meyer, Attorney Advertising: 4 Consumer Perspective, 44 J. MARKET-
INo 56 (1980). This study indicates that "personal information sources, which dominate the
actual attorney choice process, do not possess much relevance by the very people who have
employed them." Id at 62. The study found that 48% of the consumers who had employed
legal counsel said that they would have preferred additional information before actually
making their choice. The authors suggest that this indicates "the need for other than per-
sonal communication to guide the selection of legal counsel. It is here, that the removal of
professional advertising ban might most benefit the public." Id
225. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
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forms of attorney advertising would be difficult to support under either
standard, states retain more freedom to regulate under the RM.J stan-
dard. By allowing states greater freedom to regulate in this area, the
Supreme Court has increased the likelihood that states will continue to
constrain the flow of needed legal information to the American public.
John Ratino
